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FORERUNNERS OF THE PUBLIC
AUTHORITY
ROBERT J. TLDEN*
The authority has been described as the outstanding innovation in
the public law of the present century.' Its characteristic financial struc-
ture may win it recognition as America's particular contribution in the
field of municipal corporation practice. If sheer weight of numbers
provides sufficient argument, the title is already secure.
No one would deny the galaxy of imitators which have followed
the stellar example of the Port of New York Authority since its crea-
tion in 19212 or the apparent absence of those corporate bodies com-
monly called "authorities" from the standard histories written prior to
that date. Such a combination of circumstances explains, even though
it does not justify, the general impression that the public authority is
"new." In view of the recently expanded prominence of the authority
at all levels of contemporary political organization-from the inter-
national management of an inland seaway3 to the most provincial school
* Of the Va. and Mass. Bars; College of William and Mary B.A. (1940); University
of Va. Law School LL.B. (Ex '43) 1947; Harvard Law School LL.M. 1947; New York
University School of Law LL.M. 1965; Lecturer on Local Government Law, Boston
University School of Law.
1. McLean, Use and Abuse of Authorities, 42 NAT'L M muc. Rav. 438 (1953); Nether-
ton, Area Development Authorities: A New Form of Government by Proclamation,
8 VAND. L. Ray. 678 (1955); Robson, The Public Corporation in Britain Today, 63 H~Av.
L. REv. 1321, 1348 (1950); and quotation from N.Y. State special commission at page
40 infra.
2. Much has been written about the Port of New York Authority. For a concise
history of its development and a summary of its activities, see the article by its General
Counsel, Goldstein, The Port of New York Authority, 5 J. PuB. L. 408 (1956). For a
more complete study, see BARD, THE PORT oF NEw YoRK Auroarr (1942).
3. Cohen and Nadeau, Legal Framework of the St. Lawrence Seaway, 1959 U. ILL.
L.F. 29 (1959).
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building construction 4-it is expedient that this new agency be better
understood.
The purpose of this paper is to glean the fields of history for evi-
dence of those practices and social institutions which may have been
forerunners of the public authority as it now exists in order that both
its nature and its capabilities will be better known. Put another way,
the doctrine of the economy of juristic concepts is to be tested as a
fact of social science and as a tool of law.
Providing a satisfactory definition of a public authority is itself a
difficult problem on which neither the legislators nor the lawyers are
agreed. One of the best statements was drafted by Luther Gulick nearly
twenty years ago:
An authority is a governmental business corporation set up outside
of the normal structure of traditional government so that it can give
continuity, business efficiency, and elastic management to the con-
struction or operation of a self-supporting or revenue-producing public
enterprise.5
He then goes on to list the Port of New York Authority, the Tennessee
Valley Authority, and the British Broadcasting Corporation as "best
known" illustrations. His examples and his definition clearly fit the
general class of public corporations both at home and abroad. It may not
be quite narrow enough to reflect the peculiarities of the financial struc-
ture and management characteristics which, some writers in the field 6
insist, set apart the American species "authority" from the international
4. E.g., State School Building Authority, GA. CoDE ANN. (1952) § 32-1401(a) to
32-143(a); Gerwig, Public Authorities: Legislative Panacea?, 5 J. PUB. L. 401 (1956);
and Meuth, The Development of Financing Public Improvements by Kentucky Mu-
nieipalities,-25 Ky. LJ. 247 (1937).
5. Gulick, "Authorits" and How To Use There, 8 TAx REv. 47 (1947); cf., Cpuicm
op STA"i GOVEiMENTS, PUBLIC Aurnoarrms m., T STATES 3-5 (1953); and Ger ig,
Publici Authoriies in the United States, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. Pao. 591 (1961).: "A Pub-
lic Authority will be deemed to be a limited legislative agency or instrumentality of
corporate form intended to accomplish specific purposes involving long-range finiancing
of certain public facilities without legally or directly impinging upon the credit of the
state:
6. Gerwig, supra note 4, at 390. "A major distinguishing characteristic of the public
authority is its power to issue revenue bonds payable solely from charges made against
the consuming public for use of facilities provided by the particular authority. Thus
the welfare of "tie authority does not depend on tax revenue. The usual type of public
corporation, financed entirely through general obligation bonds, is not generally accepted
as a public authority.:
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genus '"public corporation." 7 It wilU however, serve as an adequate
frame of reference for the present discussion when supplemented by a
further caveat regarding semantics.
. Current American practice has become so enamored of the. word
"authority" that in addition to its legitimate use, it als)-appears in the
titles of numerous public corporations which are not authorities on
the basis of recognized criteria. Conversely, there are true authorities
which completely omit the word from their corporate names. Along
with technical applications, the older general usage continues to :be
employed. In the expression "the duly elected authorities of the com-
munity," reference is made -to individual officials, not to corporate ad-
ministrative agencies.
As mentioned above, the authority is but one of many specialized
varieties of public corporations which have been used by the federal
government almost from its founding8 and by nearly every industrialized
country for more than a century. Other familiar forms include all
sorts of special purpose* districts for schools, health, irrigation, and pub-
lic safety9 which are often collectively grouped with incorporated
towns and cities under the convenient label of "municipal corpora-
tions." Simce the municipality is generally accepted as the oldest form
of public corporation° and is much older than the familiar business
corporation,.it offers an appropriate place tobegin the genealogy of
the authority.
THE ANcE , WORLD
PRE-ROMAN" ANTIQUITY
.Although Blackstone credited the Romans with "the honour of orig-
inally inventing these political constitutions" I [ie., corporations], sub-
sequent research has demonstrated the relatively sophisticated develop-
ment of mimerous ancient cities prior to the founding of Rome. To
trace -the series of steps whereby human social organization evolved
7. Compare the definition of the port authority as given by Skehan, The Port Au-
thority, 1959.U. ILL. L.F. 58 (1959).
8. The Bank of North America, chartered by the Continental Congress, December 31,
17R1, is uisuy credited with having been first.
9. Bout s, SPEwSL Dxsnmcr GOvERNMENirS N m UN=mD STAvES .(1957); SMbrnt
".Punuc A, ur~m s, SPEc-L Disrmcrs AND LoCAL GovE-Am"T (-1964).
10.. MnAR ANCEWTs LAW 124 (5th ed.); Wiiston, The History of the Law of Busi-
ness Corporations Before 1800, 2 HA~v. L. Ray. 105 (1888) and in 3 SF.Ezcr EssAys
IN Anco-_AMmciw_. LwAL HMrY 195 (1909).
11. SFLAnswoow, BrAcKsro-''s CoMMmN-rARms 468.
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through successive federations from the individual to the family," to
the phratry or clan, to the gens or tribe,'3 and finally to the city is
beyond the purpose of this study.
To attempt to extract all the corporate precedents which might be
deduced from the ancient practices is also impracticable. The vital
principle is the concept of corporateness:
To primitive man the groups which he knew-the family, the clan,
the tribe, and the like-were not "fictions"; they were among his most
important realities. He did not theorize about them; but he recognized
in the group an entity different from and surpassing its members.
And when these earliest groups began to distintegrate and were
gradually replaced by artificial ones, the latter retained those marks of
reality which their predecessors possessed.' 4
This made easy the recognition that the city and each of its subordinate
groups was something separate and distinct from the human members
who composed it. Capable of acquiring and disposing of property,
the municipality acted through agents in much the same way it does
today. Even in its refusal to intrude within those areas which were
the exclusive concern of the gens and the families, the city demonstrated
a restraint which one might now liken to a limitation on jurisdiction.
The ancient's awareness of the corporate nature of his city is sug-
gested by his language. Civitas and urbs or their Greek equivalents, all
of which we translate by the word "city," were not synonymous in
their day. To the ancients civitas was the social and political association
of families and tribes, while urbs was the place of assembly and above
all the santuary for the deities of this association. 15 One might through
force of circumstances be obliged to remove from his native urbs, but
no human power existed to separate him from his civitas. Admittedly,
worship formed the vital bond of ancient society, but it was no less
12. Lobingier, The Natural History of the Private Artificial Person: A Comparative
Study in Corporate Origins, 13 TUL. L. REv. 41 (1938). "While the 'corporation' which
Maine perceived in the archaic family may seem very remote from the modern juristic
person of that name, the connection is direct and the process of tracing it, revealing."
13. Fus-L DE COULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY 104. "Nothing is more closely united
than the members of a gens. United in the celebration of the same sacred ceremonies,
they mutually aid each other in all the needs of life. The entire gens is responsible for
the debt of one of its members; it redeems the prisoner and pays the fine of one
condemned. If one of its members becomes a magistrate, it unites to pay the expenses
incident to the magistracy."
14. Lobingier, supra note 12, at 68.
15. Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit. supra note 13, at 134.
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corporate for having a religious foundation. Whatever its in-
ternal details, the ancient city was. a viable, self-governing municipal
corporation which bridged the era between petty priest-kings and im-
perial tyrants with demonstrations of group actions at various levels
and for numerous purposes.. So began the municipal corporation.
Ancient Rome
All that has been said of the pre-Roman ancient city was equally
true of Rome. During the period of the Republic, three distinct types
of corporate bodies existed: (1) the State (populus Romanus), (2) the
municipality (municipium), and (3) the private corporations of various
kinds (societas, collegium, sodalitium, and fraternitas).'" There were
in addition religious bodies, many of which had corporate character-
istics while others did not."' Little can be safely inferred from their
names or from the use of collegium as in the College of Pontiffs, which
was merely a group of officials. In spite of the considerable haziness as
to details, it is clear that the Romans recognized the corporate body in
law as an entity distinct from the persons who made it up, capable of
enjoying all civil rights and liabilities in the region of property and
contract.'8
In addition, the great lawgivers made lasting contributions to the law
of both municipal and business corporations. Only two points can be
noted here. One was the secularization 9 of the corporation which
contributed to the "invention" of the trading company; the other was
the extension of the scope of the civitas to limits which permitted its
subdivision into smaller units.
That Rome never developed its concept of government beyond
that of a city state h-as been suggested by Fustel. ° Even when her
dominion extended from Britain to the Euphrates, her political organi-
zation continued urban in its structure rather than national or imperial.
The basic organs of government, the Roman Senate and the Emperor,
corresponded to a city council and the mayor in function, outlook, and
habit. How the limitations of this system contributed to the eventual
collapse of the Empire is another story.
16. BUCKLAND, A TEXBooK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 175 (3d
ed. 1963).
17. PosTE, INSTITUTES oF ROMAN LAW BY GAIus 118-120 (1904).
18. BUCICLAND, THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 86 (1931).
19. HUNTER, INTRODUCTION To ROMAN LAW 2 (1921). "At a relatively early stage the
Romans made a great advance as compared with some other ancient peoples: they
separated law from religious rites and moral rules."
20. Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit. supra note 13, at 374-388.
19661
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One interesting element was the continuing demand among the lead-
ers of annexed or conquered peoples to become citizens of Rome. The
fulfillment of these demands was an installment process extending over
many years whereby principle was accommodated to necessity. The
details cannot be corisidered here except to note that the granting of
corporate character and the attendant rights to local communities was
always an act of the state. Mere physical association did not produce
municipal incorporation; that could come only from central authority. 1
The logical consequence of giving Roman citizenship was the crea-
tion of communities of citizens residing in provincial towns many
miles from the Eternal City. Their demand for legal institutions to
permit the exercise of some if not all of their rights as Romans led
to the recognition of limited local self-government. This implied a de-
parture from the ancient unity of the city and the state, for it meant that
at least some men could be citizens of Rome and at the same time have
rights as members of a subordinate community.
This idea of double citizenship underlies the Roman term municipium
which eventually denoted a township of Roman citizens with minor
rights of self-government. The evolution of the word "municipal" from
references first, to those who took the burdens of Roman citizenship
without sharing in its privileges; next, to "gift takers," i.e., those allied
to Rome by treaties of friendship which were symbolized by the
interchange of gifts; and finally, to citizens of subordinate towns, was
necessarily a long, slow process. The ultimate result, however, was to
establish a principle which became of great importance in the history
of Roman, and consequently all western governmental institutions .22
Thus, the ancient practice of the city, allowing the gens to have their
customary assemblies which enacted laws that their members were
bound to obey and the city was obliged to respect, was extended by
Rome from a religious context into the political sphere. The operative
idea was the same; namely, the capacity of the corporate body to adopt
regulations for the management of its particular affairs. In a very
real sense this principle is the foundation on which local self-government
is based. It was a factor which contributed to the rise of the national
state. It is an essential element of the public authority today.
The secularization of the ancient corporate concept in the area of
public law, which established the municipium for the purpose of local
government, was paralleled in the area of private law by the develop-
21. Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 600 (1924).
22. JoLo0W1CZ, HISTOIC. INTRODUCTION TO THE STuDy OF ROMAN LAw 62 (1952).
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ment of trading organizations for the conduct -of trade. If one will
be content not to press too hard on the distinctions which must have
existed among partnerships with many partners, associations, guilds, and
joint stock companies, he can safely infer that Rome made extensive
use of something very like the modem business corporation., This of
itself was no small contribution to economic development. Although
little -is known about the technical details of these organizations, it is
,evident that-much more was done and understood than is now disclosed
by the record.
A few examples, from the fragments on which scholars agree will
suffice to illustrate the early operation of practices which are still fami-
iar. We know that in the days of the Empire, permission of the state
(the emperor) was required in order to form a corporation (special
legislation); unless, it was one of those groups such as burial clubs which
enjoyed blanket authorization (general legislation). Burial societies, of
course, were the forerunners of life insurance companies (mutual com-
panies, no doubt).
Among the trading companies and the artisans' associations, it is diffi-
cult to draw the line of demarcation between the manufacturing-com-
mercial corporations and the labor unions, and it is not necessary in
order to demonstrate the rich development of the Roman corporation.
Waltzing23 catalogues more than one hundred fifty which have been
traced and accurately defined. Their mosaics at Ostia, Rome's ancient
port, are a tourist's must.24
At the opposite end of the scale, the best known "investment cor-
porations" were those formed to bid on government contracts to col-
lect the taxes in a given area. Strange as it may sound in modem coun-
tries, farming taxes is a practice which existed from Biblical times well
into the present era and, in a sense, into the public authority. It fre-
quently recurs in the development of the municipal corporation. The
tax farming corporations of Rome are an interesting example of using
a private business organization in lieu of governmental agencies to per-
form a public function. That is how "new" that feature of the public
authority may be.
With only fragmentary data on which to base inferences, conclu-
sions are impossible; but it seems probable that the imperial approval
of the many corporations, when granted, may have been due more to
23. WALTZING, ET DE HISTOPiQUE SUR LES CORPORATIONS PROFESSIONELLES CHEZ LES
ROMAINS (1899).
24. CARCOPINO, DAILY LiFE IN ANctmIrr RoM 175-184.
1966],
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a desire for a convenient means of regulation than to facilitate private
profits. Not subject to conjecture, however, and consistent with the
central idea is the fact that the system of Roman corporations as co-
ordinated by Augustus' legislation and the edicts of his successors per-
mitted each trade body to set up rules valid for all its members.2
It was hardly industrial democracy, but it was the germ of an idea still
very much a part of today's corporate practice-including that of the
public authority.
The temptation to explore further details of Roman corporations and
to draw comparisons with the present scene must be resisted. Not only
would a welter of detail confuse the objectives of the inquiry, but it
might imply a continuity of tradition which is not the fact so far as the
common law elements of our corporation law are concerned. The
Roman withdrawal from England was total so far as legal institutions
were concerned, and domestic influences had gone a long way in de-
veloping corporate concepts by the time Roman ideas were re-intro-
duced by the canonists and civilians.26 Accordingly, it must be recog-
nized that the chronological order of presentation implies no compar-
able continuity for the development or introduction into Anglo-
American law of the themes, discussed. The objective here is to illus-
trate the public authority's debt to history, not to trace the history of
the corporation. That field already has a large bibliography.
THE MIDDLE AGES
The major threads of corporate development during the Middle
Ages can be identified with three words: church, borough, and guild.
Each illustrates the strength of themes which recur throughout corpor-
ate life-community of interest based upon place, as a borough; and
community of interest based on a particular subject matter, as a guild.
Equally characteristic is the joining of both forces as illustrated by the
parish and trading company.
While the Universal Church was concerned with the individual soul,
the medieval community was based on classes and ranks, within a
limited and local order, feudal or municipal. The unattached individual
during the Middle Ages was one condemned either to excommunica-
don or to exile: close to death. To exist one had to belong to an
association-a household, manor, monastery, or guild. There was no
25. Id. at 183.
26. But see Lobingier, supra note 12, at 51.
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security except through group protection and no freedom that did not
recognize the constant obligations of a corporate life. One lived and
died in the identifiable style of one's class and one's corporation.27
THE CHURCH
The achievements of the medieval Christian Church in providing
a link between the ancient and modem cultures are beyond debate.
The present relevance of that history lies in the early concern which
daily experience forced the Church to have in what is now called the
concept of corporateness2 When a wealthy believer made a gift
"to the Church," had he given it to his local parish, to the immediate
diocese, or to the whole mystical body of believers? If a group of
persons (either lay or clerical) separated from its usual parish or town
and set up a new monastery or convent, or simply wandered about
Europe obeying a common discipline, what was the status, what were
the capacities, of such an organization?
These questions involved very practical considerations of church
administration and authority besides the metaphysical ones that intrigued
the doctors of theology and law. The result which is of interest for
this summary was the revived recognition of the corporate entity as a
force or body independent of or distinct from the individuals of whom
it was composed. Naturally enough, much of the debate and many of
the conclusions were expressed in theological terms, but the persona
ficta, the fictitious person concept of the corporation, was the lasting
contribution.2 The name of Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254), "the
father of the modem theory of corporations," .o is associated with this
principle because of his Commentaries; but it is likely that he was more
nearly the appellate judge than innovator.31
This view is supported by his English contemporary, Bracton, from
whose writings the following passage is often quoted as the earliest
discussion of the corporation in English legal literature:
If an abbot, prior, or other collegiate men demand land or an ad-
vowson or the like in the name of their church on the seizin of their
predecessors they say "and whereof such an abbot was seized in his
27. MUMmoiW, THE CiTy iN Hisro y 269 (1961).
28. Vinogradoff, supra note 21, at 601.
29. Stevens, The New Ohio General Corporation Act, 4 U. CINc. L. REv. 428 (1930).
30. Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J.
665 (1926); POLLOCK AND MAITLAN, HISTORY OF ENm.ISH LAW 494 (2d ed. 1898).
31. Lobingier, supra note 12 at 60.
1966]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
demesne," etc. They do not in their account trace a descent from
abbot to abbot, or prior to prior, nor do they mention the abbots or
priors intermediate (between themselves and him on whose seizin they
rely), for in colleges and chapters the same body endures forever,
although all may die one after the other and others may be placed in
their stead; just as with flocks of sheep, the flock remains the same
though the sheep die.32
Whether these decisions were the conscious implementation of a
preconceived policy or the candid summary of observable behavior pat-
terns has puzzled many students 3 for years.
Whatever its origin' the important idea of this doctrine was that
the familiar religious bodies enjoyed a perpetual existence, that they
were corporate, and that the corporation had no soul. Having no
soul they could not, and need not, receive the sacraments of the Church.
It was a persona ficta, an imaginary person. The concept was apt.
The phrase may have been inept. Later writers fell into the trap of
transliteration instead of translation, and generations of law students
have learned the words of John Marshall that a corporation is an arti-
ficial being known only in contemplation of law.3 4 Intangible, yes; ex-
isting as an image in men's minds, yes; but "fictitious," no.
A corporation exists as an objectively real entity, which any well-
developed child or normal man must perceive: the law merely recog-
nizes and gives legal effect to the existence of this entity.... A cor-
poration is an entity-not imaginary or fictitious, but real, not artificial
but natural. Its existence is as real as that of an army or of the
church.3 5
Corporations are well known to all sorts and conditions of men: to the
tax collector, tW1 the burger, to the merchant and buyer in the market
place. What a mountain of legal debate that unhappy phrase initiated.
The basic contribution of the medieval theologians, nevertheless, sur-
vived and prospered in ways they could not foresee. The religious roots
of the idea of the corporation as a person as well as the powers of the
crown are reflected in Coke's definition:
32. Bracton, f 374 b.
33. Raymond, The Genesis of the Corporation, 19 HARv. L. REv. 350 (1906); Machen,
Corporate Personality, 24 HAiv. L. REv. 253 (1911); and Vinogradoff, supra note 21.
34. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat (U.S.) 518, 636 (1819).
35. Machen, supra note 33.
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the opinion of Manwood, Chief Baron, was this as touching
Corporations, that they were invisible, immortal, and that they had no
soule; a Corporation is a body aggregate, none creates soules but God,
but the King creates them, and therefore they have no soules: they
cannot speak, nor appear in person, but by attorney.38
The idea of the corporation as an imaginary person is not the only
contribution of the Church to corporation law, but it must suffice to
represent the others. Interesting to note is the fact that the application
of persona ficta is equally appropriate whether the corporation is relig-
ious or lay, municipal or commercial, public or private. It is the foun-
dation of the familiar argument in support of the public authority, that
it is-a separate, independent entity-and not a part of the government
buxeaucracy.3
The Borough
How medieval Europe fought its way out of the dark ages which
followed the collapse of the Roman Empire has been chronicled many
times in terms of the rise of feudalism and the romantic quests of the
knights errant. Less familiar and probably more important is the
concurrent story of the use made of towns: first, in, achieving more
stable society; then, by kings to control their too powerful barons; and
finally, in the role of incorporated towns in furthering the collapse of
feudalism.38
Reduced to its minimum essentials, feudalism was a system of land
tenure in exchange for military service. Agriculture was the founda-
tion of the economy, and the operating units-whether knight's manor
or peasants' vill-endeavored to be as nearly self-sufficient as possible.
For purposes of mutual security, for agriculture, and for primitive
warfare, feudalism was reasonably efficient. For purposes of trade
beyond the local manor or village, however, for development of any
but the simplest crafts, and for fostering a fluid and creative society,
the towns early asserted their superiority.
One of the dominant themes running through this period in the
history of towns is defense. Mutual protection was, of course, a factor
36. Quoted in Wm.trocK, Tim LAW OF MuNciCPAL CoRPoRATIoNs 15 (1827).
37. Seidman, The Theory of the Autonomous Corporations, 12 PuB. ADMIN. RIv. 89
(1952).
38. Willcock, op. cit. supra note 36 at B. "The institution of municipal corporations
is said ... to have conduced more than any other circumstance to the emancipation of
Europe from the thraldom of the feudal system."
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creating feudalism, too; but towns were older. The characteristics of
the Roman walled camp are familiar. In the period between Roman
withdrawal and effective feudalism, Europeans developed the custom
of retreating to hilltops in times of danger. Crude defenses were re-
placed by permanent walls, and homes were established within them.
Traders found greater safety to display their wares, and the market
place became the location for the fair. The commerce of the fair re-
quired speedy justice and courts were added. The managers of the
place combined with the managers of the crafts, frequenting the fair
to provide more efficient and safer conduct of public business; and in
this way, the town demonstrated its value to its members. 9
This kind of corporate action was largely self-initiated and without
any concern for permission or approval. It was, however, in conflict
with the basic structure of the feudal society in which it was develop-
ing, particularly with respect to all sorts of dues, tolls, and other im-
posts which can be generalized in modem terms as taxes. Any feudal
lord who thought that the town impaired his revenues might be ex-
pected to regard it with limited approbation.
There were, however, benefits to be secured by the local barons
which they were assiduous in exploiting. Although there was infinite
variety as to details, the common pattern was that the feudal lord would
grant the freemen of a town exemption from all feudal tolls and charges
in exchange for their paying him a fixed sum every year.*4 This sum
was divided among the burgers or collected in turn by such means as
they might arrange.4°-1 It was a revival of the Roman practice of farm-
ing taxes to a corporation, only now the corporation was composed of
the residents (or some of them) of a place instead of distant investors
seeking profits.
39. MArrLAND, DOOMSDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 193 (1897). "The establishment of a
market is not one of those indefinite phenomena which the historian of law must make
over to the historian of economic processes. It is a definite and a legal act. The market
is established by law .. . which prohibits men from buying and selling elsewhere than
in a duly constituted market. To prevent an easy disposal of stolen goods is the aim
of this prohibition. Our legislators are always thinking of the cattle-lifter."
40. Id. at 203. "The definition of a burgess may involve the possession of a house
within or hard by the walls .... They are united in and by the moot and the market-
place, united under the king in whose peace they traffic; and then they are soon united
over against the king, who exacts toll from them and has favours to grant them. They
aspire to farm their own tolls, to manage their own market and their own court. The
king's rights are pecuniary rights; he is entitled to collect numerous small sums. Instead
of these he may be willing to take a fixed sum every year, or, in others words, to let
his rights go to farm."
40.1. Stubbs, Select Charters 41-44 (1890).
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The King exacted his tolls and taxes from the townsmen, and they
tried to win from him the recognition of their .rights of meeting and
market. They strove to eliminate the middlemen. They offered a
fixed round sum as the farm of their borough, and desired to assess
for themselves in their own manner the relative liabilities of burgesses
to make up that sum. Thus the payment of the firma burgi by the
community was the beginning of municipal self-government, and a
step-though not the final step-in the direction of corporateness. 41.
A second advantage that the feudal nobility found in towns was a
means to garrison defensive positions without paying for soldiers. Both
in England and on the continent, kings made grants of frontier prov-
inces as an inducement to secure the protection or extension of their
domains. The nobles, created to defend the marches, found castles
and soldiers exceedingly expensive; but the grant of municipal privileges
to a company of craftsmen or traders would serve to assure their locat-
ing at a designated place. By defending themselves, their market, and
their goods, the townsmen effectively contributed to the protection of
the frontier and to the aggrandizement of their patron as well.
A widely recognized rule of feudal law provided that any serf or
villein who escaped from the land to which he was legally bound and
who managed to remain in a town for a year and a day, became free.
A man freed from his lord's land might expect in time to become a
freeman of a town. Bcth steps represented a significant improvement
in status, and provided a ready inducement for the recruiting which
was conducted to build new towns. Even when military defense was
not a factor, economic colonialism was, and the road to self-improve-
ment was the road to town.
In such circumstances it is not surprising that numerous local lords
undertook to grant municipal charters or to settle controversies by
"confirming" purported rights which the borough claimed and the lord
disputed 2 It is also apparent that centers of population which grew up
without the benefit of any recognized authority, saw the benefits to be
realized from corporate status and proceeded to organize themselves in
imitation of their neighbors. This form of municipal creation Vino-
gradoff called the result of "social attraction" which is "manifested by
organic process apart from any agreement or definite expression of the
41. Carr, EARY Fomas OF CopoRAToNS, 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HIsToRy 170 (1909).
42. Wilcock, op. cit. supra note 36, at B; Leach, Beverly Town Documents, 14 SEL-
DON SoCIETY (1900).
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will." 3 It- is a part of the background- for the classic formula of the
early writers that a. municipal- "corporation may exist -by prescription,
or the King's charter, but that franchise cannot be claimed by any other
authority." 44
In view of the tax money, the political power, and the personal pres-
tige involved in these undertakings, both the French and the. English
kings- insisted that only the crown .ould grant municipal charters.
Initially the royal position seems to have been simply a part of the
continuing rivalry between the king and barons; but as the boroughs
and guilds grew in power, the rule acquired new importance. Ulti-
mately it achieved equal stature with the canonists' rule of persona
cta. Dean Stevens summarized it by saying:
The other notion, that a corporation is created by sovereign auth-
ority, was the skilful defense of the English Crown against the grow-
ing power of group units. The entities existed, they had to be sub-
dued, not created. Therefore it was established that they could not
exist legally without a sovereign grant of authority. These two theories,
so ancient that their independent origins are commonly forgotten, have
been coalesced into a single theory of a legal person that it is fictitious
because it is law created. 45
Restated as "only the state can grant municipal incorporation," the rule
remains in effect as formulated by the medieval kings, although in
most countries the power has now been shifted to the legislature.
While many American states delegate to an administrative official
the power to issue charters to private business corporations in accord
with general legislation, the creation of a public corporation-including
the public authority-continues the exclusive prerogative of the legis-
lature. If any new ingredient has been added by this generation, it may
be found in the authorities jointly created by two or more states, as the
Port of New York Authority; 6 or by two nations, as in the case of
the St. Lawrence Seaway.4 No feudal precedent for joint undertak-
43. Vinogradoff, supra note 21, at 599.
44. Willcock, op. cit. supra note 36, at 21. "A corporation which has existed from
time immemorial is called prescriptive, and supposed to have been originally constituted
by sufficient authority."
45. Stevens, supra note 29, at 426.
46. Note, Port District: General Considerations of an Important Type of Municipal
Corporation, 9 Dr PAUL L. REv. 74 (1959).
47. Cohen and Nadeau, Legal Framework of the St. Lawrence Seaway, 1959 ILL. L.F.
29 (1959).
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ings' comes to mind. Even these novel incorporations are. cohsisfent
with the -ancient-rule that only the highest level .of government in the
realm, can grant charters creating municipal corporations.
The Guild
The importance of the guild in the economic life of the Middle Ages
cannot be exaggerated .4 In general; there were two' types:' (1) the
craft guilds which were localized in a particular town or "area; iid
(2) the itinerant guilds whose members traveled from town to town,
from fair to fair, and from country to country.. Both types' enjoyed
the same general organization as the, boroughs; both had received
charters of creation or of recognition from some recognized sovereignty.
Smith argues that the fact that most guilds held property probably ex-
plains why they were among the earliest cases of incorporation.49
Membership was a valuable status, and every guild possessed one or
more exclusive privileges.
In many cases, the distinctions between the freemen of a borough
and the freemen of a guild are hard to trace. If there were not numer-
ous examples of both operating concurrently in the same place, one
might mistake them for equivalents. Undoubtedly, each influenced
the other in their formative periods. Their old charters imply little
or no conscious distinction in the minds of the draftsmen, and the
operative words used to create a guild or to incorporate a town were
used interchangeabl. 80 Both Coke and Holt supposed them to be
identical.5 1 Perhaps the most famous remnant of the guild system.
and one of the most dramatic demonstrations of its intimate relation
to borough government is the City of London which is stil administered
for all practical purposes through its liverymen.5
As in the case of the boroughs, the benefits to the guild were derived
48. The history of the guild (gild) has a large bibliography. A few of the best known
authorities are: GRoss, THE GIu MERclANr (1890); LAmBERT, Two THousA D YEARs OF
Gn U Lus (1891); SEuaMAN, Two CuApmn oN Tim MEDE VAL GtMuIs oF ENGLAD
(1887); SMITH, ENGLISH Guns (1870); and UNwIN, TVE Guns AmD COmPANiEs OF
LONDON (Kahl ed. 1964).
49. Lobingier, supra note 12, at 55.
50. Williston, 3 SELECr ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LE.A. HisToRY 195 at 198.
51. Leach, op. cit. supra note 42 at xxi. "At Beverly at the date of Thurstan's charter,
[c. 1130] the burgesses and the merchant gild seem to have been one and the same
body ... under two different aspects. As time went on they became entirely separate:'
Carr, op. cit. supra note 41 at 179.
52. GLAsspooL, THE COROORATION OF THE CITy OF LONDON (1924); UNWIN, THE GnDs
.AND COMPANI OF LONDON (1964).
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from their monopolies and the benefits to the crown from farming
revenues. What relevance does the medieval guild have to the public
corporation? The answer lies in the illustrations it provides of the
early exercise of familiar corporate powers: the power to sue and to
be sued as a corporation, to own real and personal property, to have a
corporate seal, and to enact bylaws. It also demonstrates the use made
by government of an incorporated body of experts to administer a
technically specialized problem.- In the first instance, regulation and
control of trade was the most common public concern and spread from
matters of simple weights and measures at the local market and fair to
international trade with the Hanse cities and the monopolies of the
Cinq Ports.14
Among the valuable "freedoms" commonly granted to guilds, was
the power to enact ordinances for the regulation of their own mem-
bers, for the regulation of the craft entrusted to them, and for the regu-
lation of the places, e.g., the market place or fair, where the monopoly
was exercised.
The guild statutes are the most interesting, as they are the most
abundant remains of the institutions themselves. They touch on many
phases of human interest and duty, in some respects taking the place
of modern municipal regulations, and are an important source for the
history of civilization in the Middle Ages. But valuable as they are in
subject matter, their chief bearing upon our present theme lies in the
manner of their enactment. The guilds applied the democratic prin-
ciple in their legislation.55
Among the many contributions to corporate law which were made
by the guilds, one of the most important, the principle of transferable
shares, was introduced indirectly. The apparent example was the prac-
tice followed by Italian cities in raising public loans in the thirteenth
and following centuries.
53. KRAMER, THE ENGLISH CRAFT GILDS AND THE GOVERNMENT 24 (1905); Leach, op.
cit. supra note 42 at lxi. "The Townsman and craftsmen both wanted protections: the
former wanted it as consumers against fraudulent dealing and false work; the latter
wanted it as producers, against the unfair competition of such fraud and falsity ... in
weaving and fulling, in dyeing and tanning, only experts could detect fraud, and the gen-
eral public had to rely on the organization of the trade itself. The assize of cloth and
leather, so to speak, had to be taken through the searchers of the cloth and leather trades,
and the community delegated its powers to them for the purpose."
54. Brodhust, The Merchants of the Staple, 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HIStORY 16 (1909).
55. LOBINGIER, THE PEoPLE's LAW 20 (1909).
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The loans were divided into shares (luoghi) and the names of the
owners were registered in special books. The shares not only passed
to the heirs in case of the owner's death, but could be freely bought
and sold.
How this device contributed to the development of the Italian joint-
stock company, and it to the English counterpart, involves several cen-
turies of legal developments. It is not free from controversy; but it
is generally accepted that the merchant guilds played a significant role
in introducing these "foreign" ideas into England, even though they
themselves appear to have made no use of the arrangement. Since the
joint-stock company was well established before the guilds passed from
the scene, it seems to be a reasonable conclusion.57
As with the modem public authority, there was infinite variety and
no more than illustrative examples may be mentioned. The London
Brewers' Records of 1422 enumerates one hundred forty,-S ranging
from mercers, grocers, and drapers through every imaginable trade
to bakers, salters, and haymongers. Like the authorities of today, the
guild operated a monopoly. Some, such as the right to collect all the
tolls for crossing a particular river, have their modem counterparts.
Also, like the authority, the guild operated with its own, i.e., private
funds as opposed to those of the crown.5 9
Today, an authority raises capital by selling bonds to private in-
vestors and guarantees them with a pledge of its revenues. Yesterday,
the guild sold memberships, levied assessments, collected tolls, and
perhaps borrowed to finance its operation. Thus, using private capital,
the guild conducted an essentially private business operation and at
the same time, performed duties of regulation, inspection, and control
on behalf of the crown. The public authority's use of private
capital to conduct the business of the public is not new. It is no exag-
geration to suggest that in many ways the medieval borough and guild
live on in the public corporations of today.
56. Mitchell, Early Forms of Partnership, 3 SELEcr ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AMERICAN LWa.
HISTORY 193 (1909).
57. HOiDSWORTH, 8 Hisr. OF ENG. LAW 207 (1929). "There can be little doubt that
the origin of the joint stock principle, like the origin of so many other principles of
our modern commercial law, must be sought in mediaeval Italy."
58. Unwin, op. cit. supra note 52 at Appendix A 11.
59. Leach, op. cit. supra note 42 at xli.
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EXPANDED 'HoRIzoNs
THE. JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
In 1554 the first English joint-stock company was chartered; 60 in
1784 New York enacted the first American general incorporation law.6
Between those two dates the major chapters in the history of the evolu-
tion of the joint-stock company are concentrated. It is a romantic
story, intimately concerned with the age of discovery and colonization
of the "New World." Not only the western hemisphere was involved
but remote areas of Africa, India, and the Far East were as well. Merely
to call the roll of some of the better known -names conjures images
of faraway places and memories of high adventureY2
Great constitutional conflicts in the struggle toward representative
democracy grew out of controversies with the joint-stock companies.
For example, the House of Lords lost its original jurisdiction over civil
cases as a result of its effort to do justice to a British merchant wronged
by a joint-stock company.3 This 'landmark case in the matter of the
Lords' jurisdiction deserves new recognition as an early demonstration
of the company/corporation's importance as a unit whose activities
have had direct and indirect political consequences. Reformers may be
interested to note that the unfortunate Skinner was totally denied the
justice that everyone appears to have recognized was due him-an
unsung martyr to social progress. 4
Most of the official names were tediously long, as "Gouvernour and
Assistants of the Citie of Raliegh in Virginia" or the "Company of
Merchants of London Trading to the East Indies." I" Perhaps the long-
est name belonged to the company chartered under the title of
"Merchants Adventurers of England for the discovery of lands, terri-
tories, isles, dominions and signiories, unknown and not before that
late adventure or enterprise by sea or navigation commonly fre-
60. Lobingier, Natural History of the Private Artificial Person, 13 TUL. L. REv. 58
(1939).
61. Baldwin, Private Corporations in the Colonies and States, 3 SELECT EssAYs IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 255 (1909).
62. Carr, Select Charters of Trading Companies, 28 SELDON SOCIETY (1913), contains
forty-one representative grants ranging in date from 1530 to 1707, edited from the
Patent Rolls in the Public Record office. The editor's extensive introduction (136 pp.)
is doubtless the authoritative discussion in the field.
63. Skinner v. The East India Company, 6 S.T. 710 (1666).
64. Emerson, CORPORATE AND POLITICAL POLICY IN A JURISDICTIONAL BATrL: SKINNER
V. THE EAST INDIA COMPANY (1666), 33 DETROIT LJ. 1 (1955).
65. Williston, The History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800, 3 SELECt
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 199 (1909).
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quented." 6' Abbreviation became a practical necessity and those which
are commonly remembered are better known by shorter designations
such as the African Company, the Russia Company, and the Turkey
Company, and, perhaps most familiar to Americans, the Hudson Bay
Company.
The gradual and logical progression from the many-member partner-
ship to. the regulated company, to the joint-stock company, to the cor-
poration cannot be traced here. Only two points particularly relevant
to the future public authority can be noted. First emphasis should be
given to the magnitude of the role of the stock company as an insti-
tution in the establishing of America. This was pointed out by Chief
Justice Simeon E. Baldwin of the Supreme Court of Errors of Con-
necticut more than half a century ago.
The law of corporations was the law of their being for the four
original New England colonies. Of whatever else they might be
ignorant, every man, Woman, and child must know something of that.
It governed all the relations of life. This was true, whether the gov-
ernment to which they were subject was set up under a charter
from the crown or those who held a royal patent, or-as in New
Haven-was a theocratic republic, owing its authority to the con-
sent of the inhabitants. The one rested on the law of private corpora-
tions de jure: the other on that of public corporations de facto.67
The same position is shared by the American historian, Edward P.
Cheyney, who added, "In fact the whole advance of English discovery,
commerce, and colonization in the sixteenth and early seventeenth cen-
turies was due not to individuals, but to the efforts of corporate
bodies."088
To trace the naturalization of the corporation in the New World
would occupy several volumes 9 and would add only corroborative
detail. The role of the stock company, however; should not be limited
to the initial settlements. On the contrary:
... as fast as the plantations grew into communities their inhabi-
tants naturally reproduced the corporate institutions with which they
66. Carr, supra note 62 at xxx.
67. Baldwin, supra note 61, at 236.
68. Cheyney, Some English Conditions Surrounding the Settlement in Virginia, 12
AM. Hisr. Rxv.-512 (1907).
.69. E.g., DAVIS, EssAYs IN THE EARLIER HisroRY OF AMERICAN CoRpoRATIONs, two -vol-
umes (XVI and XVII) of Harvard Economic Studies (1917).
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and their fathers had been familiar in the mother country. The earliest
of these to spring up in America were of the type which we should
now designate as public corporations-such as towns, boroughs, and
cities; but before the end of the colonial period a considerable number
of truly private corporations had been established, for ecclesiastical,
educational, charitable, and even business purposes.70
The second characteristic of the joint-stock company which fore-
shadowed the modern public corporation was its ability to attract and
manage large sums of private capital for public purposes. This cap-
ability, perhaps more than any other, led to its superseding the
merchant guilds as a vehicle for prosecution of overseas trade. The
large amounts of capital required to outfit and maintain colonizing-
trading ventures, the extended period before expeditions returned, the
need of patents from the crown, and the high risk of loss all combined
to make group cooperation essential at the dawn of the colonial era.
The joint-stock company proved itself adapted to this purpose and its
growth was rapid, in terms of numbers, in terms of varied applications71
other than overseas trade, and in terms of development toward the
familiar business corporation.
Professor Williston reports that upwards of two hundred companies
had been formed by 1720 for the prosecution of every kind of enter-
prise, including one for "Insurance and Improvement of Children's
Fortunes" and another for "Making Salt Water Fresh." 72 The greater
portion of the companies operating in this period were not incorporated
and when writs of scire facias were issued to inquire into their right to
usurp corporate powers, many came to an end. This episode precipi-
tated by the Bubble Act73 produced a sudden collapse of the enorm-
ously inflated public credit which carried many weak businesses to
disaster along with the fraudulent ones. Its influence on subsequent
corporate legislation was felt for many years thereafter.
In order to appreciate the framework in which the joint-stock com-
pany operated as well as the business corporation into which it evolved,
its relation to the government or the crown must be kept in mind.74
70. Davis, op. cit. supra note 69, vol XVI, at 4.
71. E.g., Carr, supra note 62 at xi lists exploration, foreign trade, colonization, mining,
fishing, industry, banking, insurance, and water companies.
72. Williston, supra note 65, at 202.
73. 6 Geo. I, c. 18 §§ 18-22 (1720); repealed, 4 Geo. IV, c. 94 (1825).
74. Laski, The Early History of the Corporation in England, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 583.
"The relation . . . between monopolies and joint-stock enterprise is the dominant note
of the time."
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No such ideas of corporate independence which the Victorian business-
men espoused were known or dreamed of in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.
The modern joint-stock corporation grew out of the union of the
ideas of association for the government of a particular trade by those
who carried it on, and of combination of capital and mutual coopera-
tion, suggested and made necessary by the great expense incident to
carrying on trade with distant countries. But the corporation was
far from being regarded as simply an organization for the more con-
venient prosecution of business. It -was looked on as a public agency, to
which had been confided the due regulation of foreign trade, just as
the domestic trades were subject to the government of the guilds.75
That this appears to have become accepted law by the beginning of
the eighteenth century is illustrated by a classic quotation from one of
the earliest (but anonymous) writers in the corporate field. In a book
published in 1702 and aptly entitled The Law of Corporations, the
author says:
The general intent and end of all civil incorporations is for better
government, either general or special. The corporations for general
government are those of cities and towns, mayor and citizens, mayor
and burgesses, mayor and commonalty, etc. Special government is
so called because it is remitted to the managers of particular things,
as trade, charity, and the like, for government, whereof several com-
panies and corporations for trade were erected, and several hospitals
and houses for charity.76
The concept that the purpose of a stock company is to combine the
public objective of managing and ordering the particular trade in which
it is engaged, as well as the private one of profit for its shareholders, is
also to be found in the charters granted to the so-called "new" business
corporations, particularly in the recitals that the company shall have
the exclusive control of the trade entrusted to it.7' The similarities be-
tween these early practices and the public authority of this decade need
not be labored.
75. Williston, supra note 65, at 200.
76. ANoNYMOuS, TE LAw OF CORPORATIONS (1702), cited by WiUiston, 201.
77. Carr, op. cit. supra note 62 at lxvi et seq.
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COLONIAL CORPORATIONS
As already noted, American colonial history is the history of the
corporation. The American- Revolution, as a trial by combat, was the
court of last resort in the prolonged controversy over the doctrine of
the inviolability of the grants and franchises contained in the colonial
chartes. 78 Stated'another way, the basic question of the period in the
field of corporation law was concerned with the nature and legal status
of the corporations which were created by the colonial charters.
The problem divided into several major areas: (1) there were ques-
tions dealing with the right of the English government to change cor-
pqrafions chartered in England and functioning in America; (2) there
were disputes regarding the subordinate public corporations created by
the crown-chartered American companies in exercise of their alleged
powers; and (3) there were doubts as to the legality of the companies
and corporations created by the colonial legislatures for private business
ventures.
7 9
In the early 1600's, there were only three trading companies with
English charters playing a significant role in the colonies: the East India
Company, the Royal African Company, and the Hudson Bay Com-
pany.80 These were soon followed by the proprietary companies which
evolved into the thirteen rebellious states. Their metamorphoses from
business to municipal corporations and the colonists' insistence on the
freemen's inherent right to local self-government as part of the rights
and privileges of Englishmen is the central theme of the eighteenth
century, the foundation issue underlying the American Revolution.
Along the way, the monopolies previously enjoyed by the "regulated"
companies were wiped out by the Parliament which came into office
with the Glorious Revolution of William and Mary in 1688.81 In 1717,
the Attorney General and the Solicitor General combined to oppose
granting a charter to a proposed marine insurance company as a danger-
ous experiment.82 The Parliament, in 1741, responded to the fears of
the Governor of Massachusetts with legislation. He was alarmed- by
the formation in that colony of the largest voluntary joint-stock com-
pany then known, the "Manufacturing Company" or Land-bank. of
Massachusetts. The act of Parliament passed in that year made unlawful
78. Baldwin, supra note 61, at 236 and 252.
79. Davis, op. cit. supra note 69, Vol. XVI, at 30.
80. Baldwin, supra note 61, at 249.
81. Ibid.
82. Id. at 250.
[Vol. 7:1
FORERUNNERS- OF -.PUBLIC - AUTHORITY
the establishment of or transaction- of business in any English colony
by any unincorporated joint-stock company having transferable shares
and consisting of over six persons.83' Severe penalties were provided, and
this extension of the Bubble Act of 1720. to 'the colonies continued the
law of the land for every American col6ny nl the Revolution.
Prior to the Act of 1741, only three business coripbrations' had been
chartered by colonial legislatures. After the Declaration of Indepefid-
ence until the end of the century, the number of incorporations granted
probably did not exceed two hundred fifty.1s The restrictions imposed
on, corporations by the crown clearly failed to meet the needs of an
expanding economy, and interesting features are found in the expedi-
ents.used to approximate the corporation's advantages. In Connecticut,
for example, when plans for Yale were being formed, the ill conse-
quences which had followed the Great and General Court of Massa-
chusetts in presuming to give Harvard a charter in 1650 'were well
remembered; and the Connecticut Assembly, guided by its counsel,
Judge Samuel Sewall, carefully avoided giving any definite form of
incorporation to the ten trustees or "undertakers." s0 Half a century
was to pass before formal incorporation was achieved. The. modem
lawyer may find difficulty in believing that the simple omizsion of the
common words of art from a charter would exempt unlawful acts
from the sanctions of the statute, but the evident presence of Yale is
eloquent testimony to the success of the stratagem.
Another expedient employed was to give adjoining proprietors of
lowlands or the proprietors situated along a common watercourse, the
power to. associate for improving their properties in such manner as a
majority might determine.
Some of these drain companies were made quasi-corporations and
could sue in the name of the treasurer. They were really public
agencies, created on account of the interest of the State in regulating
a use of land or water shared in by many under separate titles, and it
was no part of their purpose to make money for their members.
Indeed their powers extended 'over th6se who might not desire to
come into them precisely as is the case with municipal corporations.80
83. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 192. ". " . the essence of a joint-stock company does
not consist in the principle of limited responsibility, but rather in the prolongation
of the corporate existence and organization of the company beyond the life of its mem-
bers and' in the free negotiability of the shares."
84. Baldwin" supra note 61 at 242; Davis, op. cit. supra, Vol. XVII, at 6.
85. Davis, op. cit supra note 69, Vol. XVI, at 21.
86. Baldwin, supra note 61, at 245.
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The kinship between these quasi-corporations and the public authority
is easily seen.
Of the charters granted prior to 1800 for moneyed corporations, two-
thirds were of a quasi-public character, such as for the improvement of
transportation facilities by roads, bridges, and canals, or by deepening
rivers or harbors. Fewer than eighty corporations existed which in-
volved daily contacts with the public and included twenty-eight banks
and twenty-five insurance companies.8 7
The number, however, of public and municipal corporations, or re-
ligious societies, academies, li'brary 'companies, and of public quasi-
corporations such as the drain companies, was very large by the end
of the century. The gift of the American Revolution to the law of
corporations-the principle of freedom of incorporation or organization
under general laws-had been quickly applied in several states. New
York led the way with a general incorporation law in 1784. Delaware
followed in 1787,88 and Pennsylvania in 1791. This new philosophy
marked the end of the common law doctrine that a corporate charter
evidenced special trust in the incorporators which implied a trust and
justified a liberal construction of its rights and powers. So far did the
pendulum swing for both business corporations and municipal ones that
the courts soon held a corporation to have no powers except those
necessary for the proper exercise of its express powers or indispensable
to the fulfillment of the public purpose to be attained. For this prin-
ciple to become known as "Dillon's Rule" took many years, but its
origin was early in the days of the Republic. 9
Perhaps the most significant effect of the American Revolution on
corporate law, or of the general incorporation statutes which followed
the end of hostilities, lay in the separation which resulted, whereby
the private business corporation became distinct from the public or
municipal corporation. Before 1800, the primary reason for incorpora-
tion was to serve some public purpose. After 1800, business and eco-
nomic reasons were adequate motives.
These historic developments have left permanent evidence of the
past on the law of corporations:
... as to the points which modern business corporations have in
87. See Davis, op. cit. supra note 69, Vol. XVII, at 332, "Appendix B: American
Charters to business coporations 1781-1800, classified by objects and arranged . . . in
chronological order."
88. LAws oF DELAWARE, II, 879 (1797).
89. Cf. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & M.R.R.Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868).
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common with the early guilds and municipalities, the law relating
to them dates back farther than almost any other branch of the law,
while as to the points which belong exclusively to the conception of
the business corporation, the law has been formed very largely since
1800. And iot only had a body -of new law to be thus formed, but
old doctrines laid down by early judges as true of all corporations,
though in reality suited only to the kinds of corporations then existing,
had to be discarded or adapted to changed conditionsPi
One further corporate doctrine was developed in this period which
should be mentioned: that a corporation can acquire a legal existence
under the laws of several states by accepting a charter from each.91
This had been done at the outset by the Bank of North America, char-
tered by the Continental Congress in 178192 and then by Pennsylvania
in 1782. What began as a doubtful novelty, ultimately became standard
operating procedure. Eventually, the States of New York and New
Jersey in creating the Port of New York Authority under the state
compact clause of the Constitution, carried the practice a step further
by combining in the creation of a single- corporation by their joint act.93
THE INDUSTRIAL ERA
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The American and French Revolutions which closed the eighteenth
century released, or at least reduced, in those countries the political
restraints which previously had inhibited the easy formation of corpora-
tions for the convenience of private enterprise. Stimulated by the mount-
ing pressure of those forces now collectively called "the industrial revo-
lution," the business community lost no time in utilizing the corporation
as a convenient receptacle in which to pool extensive capital, diverse
skills, specialized management, and divided risk.94
90. Williston, supra note 65, at 204.
91. Baldwin, supra note 61, at 253.
92. Cf. note 8 supra and note 95 infra.
93. Goldstein, The Port of New York Authority, 5 J. PUB. L. 408 (1956); BARD, THE
PORT OF NEw YORK Au-rHoarrY (1942).
94. Seidman, The Tbeory of the Autonomous Corporation, 12 PUB. ADMIN. Rxv. 89
(1952). "The industrial boom of the 1870's marked, the beginning of what has often
been described as the 'era of the corporate revolution' in the United States. Prior to
the Civil War, use of the corporate form in the industrial field was confined almost
entirely to the textile industry. But the transition from an agriculture to an industrial
economy, accompanied as it was by the rapid growth of 'big business,' greatly stimulated
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Although the first corporation chartered after the American Revo-
lution was a public one,95 the characteristic feature of nineteenth cen-
tury corporate life was the extensive expansion-both in number and in
size-of private commercial corporations and the overshadowing by
them of the older public corporations. So complete was this change
of relative importance that hardly a century later after several genera-
tions of laissez faire political and economic philosophy, the widespread
revival of the public corporation by the New Deal was castigated as
state socialism.96 At the same time, proponents of the policy were
prophesying that:
*. . with the growth of government-owned business corporations
there will be development of a field of administrative and substantive
law broad in extent and challenging to the pioneer who undertakes to
explore its contents and area.9
Anyone even slightly familiar with developments in the public law
field knows how true this forecast was. A random comparison of
articles in the law journals wilf demonstrate it."8 Whether the issue is
tort liability or the adoption of a liberal policy of free incorporation, the
validity of the charge is not the question. The point simply illustrates
how quickly in human affairs the privilege of yesterday becomes the
right of tomorrow.
From the standpoint of'the national government, it can be said fairly
that the entire nineteenth century was a period in which the govern-
ment encouraged private operations where profit and general welfare
combined, and not a period of government operating through state-
owned corporations." Wherever the corporate device was used, it
the use of the corporate form because of the advantages it offered in the way of
limited liability and pooled investment."
95. The Bank of North America, Act of Dec. 31, 1781, 7 JOURNAL OF CONGRESS 257-8.
96. Reed, Government Controlled Business Corporations: A Symposium, 10 Tut. L.
REv. 79 (1935).
97. Id at 88.
98. E.g., compare: Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England, 32 HARV. L. REv.
447 (1918) with Note, The Applicability of Sovereign Immunity to Independent Public
Authorities, 74 HARv. L. REv. 714 (1961).
99. Reed, supra note 96, at 81. The scarcity of federal corporations prior to 1916
demonstrates the point. JDuring the short-lived First and Second Banks of the United
States, only'the interest of the federal government was not more than twenty per cent.
It was 1902 before the stock of the Panama Railroad Company (which had been char-
tered as a private corporation in New -York State in 1849) was acquired. Not until
World War I were government~owned corporations organized on any significant
scale.
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seems to have been adopted because it facilitated the participation of
private capital rather than because it was regarded as a sound method of
government operation.1' °
The extensive development of the privately owned commercial enter-
prise created a new dichotomy of corporations based upon ownership,
and classifications in terms of public corporations and private corpora-
tions replaced the time honored ecclesiastical and lay classifications of
the earlier commentators.' 0 ' Whatever other implications this develop-
ment may suggest, it is relevant here as the basis of a portion of the
working terminology now used in the field.
In spite of its simple origin and apparently clear meaning in the
foregoing context, the word "public" when applied to corporations
creates still an ambiguous term.0 2 For example, corporations which are
closely held, as by the members of one family or a few families, as was
the Ford Motor Company, may elect to make their shares available to
many investors by meeting the respective requirements of the Security
Exchange Commission and of the stock exchanges for trading in the
open market. In such event, the companies are said to have "gone
public" as opposed to having been "closely held."
In both cases, one can say that the corporation is publicly owned.
The difference depends upon the techniques employed. The Recon-
struction Finance Corporation is owned by the public, organized as a
political entity in the form of the nation. General Motors is owned by
the public, otherwise unorganized, as a myriad of individual investors. 03
The curious feature lies not so much in the distinctions of structure
between the two organizations as in the similarities of the results where
heavy personal and corporate income taxes reduce the net earnings per
share of stock to levels not greatly different from the return on tax
exempt public corporation bonds. This fact has a major influence in
assuring a continued market for the securities issued by the public auth-
orities.
A further separation between business and government resulted from
100. Reed, supra note 96, at 81; Field, Govennent Corporations, a Proposal, 48 HAv.
L. REv. 775 (1935).
101. Williston, supra note 65, at 195, citing Coke, Blackstone, and Kyd on Corpora-
tions.
102. Field, supra note 100, at 777. "The concept of a corporation is a troublesome one,
and upon analysis lacks that precision of constituent elements and boundaries so com-
monly associated with it."
103. Thurston, Governmental Proprietary Corporations, 21 VA. L. REv. 352 (1935).
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the Borough Reform Act of 183504 in England, and its American coun-
terparts as individual states acted to correct the more flagrant abuses
in their respective cities.1 5 Generalization about such diverse situations
is dangerous, but it appears clear that one effect of these reforms was
to reduce the private, proprietary, profitable-for-a-few nature of a city
and enhance its role as an administrative unit for local government and
a device for popular self-determination. Another result was the em-
phatic distinctions which were developed between the municipal cor-
poration and the business corporation, thereby making their reunion
in the public authority a far more dramatic achievement than it actually
was in the light of historic precedent.
THE SPECIAL PURPOSE DISTRICT
In both England and America, wide use was made of the special pur-
pose district as a vehicle for reform, where municipal organization
already existed, and as a means for providing selected services where
municipal organizations were absent or inadequate to do the job."0 6
First used for relief of the poor and then for school purposes, the special
district was quickly adopted for fire protection, public health, water,
and other utilities.10 7
In its earlier applications the special .district was organized on a geo-
graphical basis, and all taxable properties within the district were charged
with a proportionate share of the cost. Where the district was created
to provide free education or fire protection, there was no alternative
source of revenue. District organizations and management were based
upon the ratepayers, and adherence to a form of popular democracy
was common.
The key test of a special district as a separate unit of government
is not whether its governing body is appointed or elected or even ex
104. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Aar OF 1835, 5 & 6 Will. IV, c. 76; LELY, THE LAW OF
MUNIcIA CoRPoRATIoNs, xii (1882).
105. Williams and Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Constitutional
Debt Limitations, 37 CoLUM. L. REv. 177 (1937). Massachusetts revised its Constitution
in 1820 providing for city government for the first time. Virtually every other state
enacted constitutional revisions during the following years, particular attention being
given to limitations on taxing and borrowing. See note 111 infra.
106. Foley, Revenue Financing of Public Enterprises, 35 MICH. L. Rxv. 1 (1936);
Dearing, Turnpike Authorities in the United States, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 741
(1961).
107. Williams and Nehemkis, supra note 105 at 187; Porter, A Plague of Special Dis-
tricts, 22 NAT. Mumic. REv. 545 (1933).
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officio . . . . The basic determinant is whether the district possesses
substantial freedom from other governments in its fiscal and adminis-
trative operations. 08
Whenever the services became technically more complex, as in furnish-
ing water or electricity, the districts tended to be less and less oriented
to their geographical boundaries or to their residents and more to the
subscribers who paid for the service provided. Soon the necessary in-
come of the district was typically derived from monthly payments for
services rendered rather than from annual taxes.109
A middle course still commonly employed, as in the case of water
district finance, is to assess the landowners of the district and to use
the resulting tax revenue to pay off the bonds which provided the
capital construction. Charges paid by the consumers for service de-
frays the operating expenses.
In some situations, such as the operation of toll bridges or tunnels,
there is no geographical area or population which affords any logical
basis for organizing or selecting the management of a special purpose
district. This problem is met in the act of incorporation by providing
for the composition of the corporation, either by appointing designated
officials or by giving the power of appointment to a suitable executive,
typically the governor or mayor.
THE REVENUE BOND
Concurrent with the growth of the special district device, the prin-
ciple of the special fund was developed to finance the construction of
the plants and accouterments which the growing demand for public
services required. Briefly stated, the special fund doctrine affirms that:
... obligations payable solely from a special fund derived from the
revenues of the enterprise for the acquisition or improvement of
which such obligations are issued do not constitute bonds or debts
within the meaning of constitutional limitations or restrictions of
bonds or incurring of indebtedness." 0
As a result of ari earlier period of reform, most state constitutions con-
tained provisions limiting municipal borrowing to a stated percentage
108. BOLLENS, SPECIAL Disnucr Gov RNMENrs 35 (1957).
109. Fordham, Revemie Bond Sanctions, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 401 (1942).
110. Foley, supra note 106 at 7.
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of assessed valuation."1 As a child of necessity, the special fund theory
and its twin, the revenue bond, were utilized to escape those constitu-
tional and statutory limitations. When their use by the municipality to
finance capital outlays for internal improvements was judicially attacked,
it was a simple matter to transfer the project to a special district and to
pledge its revenues from the services to be rendered instead of the
municipality's committing revenues to be derived from taxation. Most
state courts had found no difficulty in ruling that the debts of the special
district were not the debts of the municipality;"' but special funds with-
in the municipality were. The doubts cast on the special fund system
precipitated a plethora of legislation creating urban and rural im-
provement authorities." 3
The triumph of the special district as a borrowing agency was not
achieved without resistance. Many constitutional lawyers at the time
and students of the problem today still doubt the validity of allowing
a city to do indirectly what it cannot legally do directly. The objec-
tion is more than a doctrinal one, having practical application in assess-
ing the true borrowing power of a community. Without attempting
to collect all the arguments, the following quotation is representative
of the local responsibility school of thought:
The revolution accomplished by the special fund doctrine, the full
flower of which is the revenue bond, has thus completed the annihila-
tion of effective control by debt limits. It is widely thought that
revenue financing provides services, at no cost to the taxpayer; which
directly and accurately relate benefits to burdens, and which for the
first time-by solid emphasis on management-apply to government the
criteria and utilize the powerful economic motivations that work well
in private enterprise.
But the successful by-passing of debt limits, though freeing govern-
ment units to seek needed private capital, obscures the debt status of
the issuing municipality to the point of almost complete confusion." 4
In spite of all objections, by the end of the nineteenth century, all
111. Gerwig, Public Authorities in the United States, 26 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 596
(1961); Williams and Nehemkis, supra note 105.
112. Kennebec Water District v. City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234 (1902); People v.
Salomon, 51 Il. 37 (1869).
113. Foley, supra note 106 at 9.
114. Virtue, The Public Use of Private Capital: A Discussion Relating to Municipal
Bond Financing, 35 VA. L. REv. 293 (1949); Morris,. Evading Debt Limitations with
Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J.
234 (1958).
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these techniques and an infinite variety of combinations and mutations
as well, had been worked out so that the necessary intellectual and legal
elements were available with which to meet the challenge of the new era.
Actually, a demonstration case was initiated in Maine" 5 before the cen-
tury closed. The newly created Kennebec Water District utilized the
principles of the special purpose district (instead of the municipality),
employing use charges for services rendered (instead of taxation of
property) to secure the payment of bonds which were sold to the pub-
lic in order to finance the purchase or construction of plant and equip-
ment. The last particular, the use of revenue bond financing," 6 was
destined to become the distinguishing mark of the public authority;
but who among its sponsors in 1899 could foresee the dominant role this
device was to play in the expansion of municipal facilities and in the
explosion of the municipal bond market during the decades following
World War II?
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
With the arrival of the new century, all the elements which contrib-
ute to the make-up of the public authority were at hand. Only tvo
things more were needed-a proper name and recognition. For the
name, an English precedent was followed. For recognition, nothing
contributed more than the success and prominence of the first and big-
gest authority of them all, the Port of New York Authority. Writing
about the experiences of New York in an exhaustive report to the State
Legislature in 1953, the reporter for the Commission declared:
The public authority is one of the most significant developments in
modem governmental administration. It has captured the imagination
of the public and has gained substantial support in the investing com-
munity. Over the last fifty years the public authority device has grown
into a significant element of government, and its area of operation has
sp-ead into a number of divergent fields. So great has been its growth
115. Kennebec Water District v. City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 52 A. 774 (1902);
Maine Laws (1899), c.-200. The water district included all or parts of several munic-
ipalities; had power of eminent domain; it could charge for services, but could not
levy taxes; could issue bonds which were declared to be obligations of the district
and not of the towns.
116. Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 396 (1942). "The term
'revenue bond' is employed in this discussion as a matter of convenience to identify more
or less long-term obligations of public corporations or agencies . . . which are payable
solely from the revenues of particular properties or services as distinguished from the
familiar tax-supported general obligations of local government units."
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that the public authority requires recognition as a significant vehicle
for public administration.117
As previously observed, the United Kingdom had experimented with
many forms of special purpose districts to cope with internal improve-
ment problems. The management of seaports with their complex facil-
ities has been among the oldest and most difficult municipal adminis-
trative problems. The medieval city-states of Genoa and Venice have
been credited with having developed the earliest public authorities
known in order to administer maritime law in connection with the
handling of ships and cargo in the harbors.1 8 As early as 1857, a dis-
trict was organized to resolve the problems created by the rivalries be-
tween Liverpool and Birkenhead;" 9 a similar arrangement was set up
for Glasgow under the Trustees of the Clyde Navigation.'20 Although
the organization of these agencies was more like that of a trust than of
a corporation, it made no significant difference in the operations. The
success of these experiments led to the adoption of a similar special or-
ganization for the Port of London in 1908.121
In British usage, it had long been customary (as it still is) to call all
local government organizations, cities, boroughs, towns, agencies, dis-
tricts and their officials "authorities." 122 It is a generic term and applies
to a wide variety of situations; it has long been similarly used in
America also, although less commonly. For example, shortly after the
Civil War, the Supreme Court of Illinois in upholding the creation of
a special purpose district with a single function and the power of taxa-
tion, went on to say:
There is no prohibition ... against the creation by the legislature, of
every conceivable description of corporate authority, and when created
to endow them with all the faculties and attributes of other pre-existing
corporate authorities. Thus . . . there is nothing . . . to prevent the
legislature from placing the police department of Chicago, or its fire
117. NEw YoRK TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE COORDINATION OF STATE AcTivmEs,
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES UNDER NEW YORK STATE 3 (1953).
118. FAIR, PORT ADMINISTRATION IN TM UNITED STATES 14 (1954).
119. MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD AcT, 1857.
120. Fair, op. cit. supra note 118 at 15.
121. PORT OF LONDON AcT, 1908, Sect. 1; see now PORT OF LONDON (CONSOLIDATION)
Acr, 1920, Sect. 6.
122. Government Control over Local Autborities, 123 JusT. P.S. Loc. Govr. R. 73
(1959).
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department, or its water works, under the control of an authority
123
In all probability, the use of the word "authority" in the Act of Parlia-
ment which established the Port of London Authority was virtually
equivalent to giving the agency no name at all. Its selection is said
to have been proposed by Lloyd George because of the many tasks
which the act gave the new organization "authority" to do.
124
That which had been a generic term in the London of 1908, never-
theless, became a word of art in the New York of 1921, when the
joint resolutions of two states and the concurrence of the Congress
created the Port of New York Authority.125 Although drawing heavily
on the English experience, the Port of New York incorporated many
distinctive features. In place of a governing board chosen by wharfing-
ers, rivercraft operators, the Admiralty, the London County Council,
and others 26 the governing board of the Port of New York is ap-
pointed half by the Governor of New Jersey and half by the Governor
of New York. Instead of financing by Act of Parliament and dues
from members, the distinctive feature of the financing of the New
York Authority was the issuance of its own bonds, guaranteed by the
pledge of its revenues to be collected from tolls charged the users of
its services. Thus by a series of historical accidents, the name "Author-
ity" was attached to a form of public corporation which has now been
recognized as a separate classification based primarily on the particulars
of its financial structure.1'
The revival of public corporations under the pressures of World
War I and the New Deal 2 8 and the proliferation of the public authority
as an agency for international,' 9 interstate, 30 state, and municipal man-
123. People v. Salomon, 51 IM. 37, 59 (1869).
124. Edelstein, The Authority Plan-Tool of Modern Govermnent, 28 CoIINEL L.Q.
182 (1943).
125. N.Y. LAws 1921, c. 203; NJ. LAws 1921, c. 152; consent of Congress to the
compact, 42 STAT. 174 (1921).
126. GRImIi AND STREE, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 283 (1963).
127. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVF.RNmENTS, Puuc AumoRrrms IN THE STATES 3 (1953);
Edelstein, supra note 124 at 177; and Fair, Port Authorities in the United States, 26
LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 703 (1961).
128. Wehler, Goverment Controlled Business Corporations, 10 TutL. L. REv. 98
(1935). "There . . . have been attained, by the device of the American government-
controlled business corporation, an achievement in swift statecraft and creative force
seldom excelled in the history of American political institutions."
129. Niagara Falls and Buffalo-Fort Erie Bridges, New York and Canada; Hahn;
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agement of specialized services in the decades following World War II
are outside present consideration. It is sufficient to note that it has be-
come a numerous clan with every indication that the trend will con-
tinue. 31
... The evolution of the Public Authority as an instrument of gov-
ernment is not yet complete; perhaps it is even too early to predict
with confidence what its ultimate form will be. Yet the examples of
the past thirty years attest the hasty pace with which we are experi-
menting with Public Authorities as replacements for organized political
subdivisions of the states in the performance of many functions. 132
RECAPITULATION
How new is the public authority? Clearly, the foregoing survey does
not attempt to cover the long and eventful history of the corporation, of
which story the evolution of the public authority is only a part. What
was attempted and what hopefully has been demonstrated is that vir-
tually every age of human experience has made its contribution to the
institution which now collects our highway tolls, runs our airports,
builds college dormitories, and administers a host of other services,
literally too many to enumerate.
In the ancient family and tribe, we discern a concept of corporateness
which built their cities and organized their worship. The Romans
developed, refined, and utilized the corporate principle as a basis for
organizing trade, industry, and provincial municipalities. The canonists
and the civilians made intellectual and practical contributions to the
evolving corporation which the freemen of the boroughs and the guilds
forged into functioning realities of town and craft.
Inspired by the examples of the renaissance Italian bankers and traders
and goaded by Spanish and Portuguese rivalry, the Elizabethan merchant
adventurers evolved the joint-stock company to perform undertakings
beyond the resources of any single individual and demonstrated the
power of pooled capital. The age of exploration led to the age of en-
international and Supranational Public Authorities, 26 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 638
(1961).
130. The Lake Champlain Bridge, New York and Vermont; Leach, Interstate Au-
thorities in the United States, 26 LAW Aim CoiNTamI,. PROB. 666 (1961).
131. Smrrn, PuBLIc AuTHoarrES, SPECIAL Dismiars AND LocAL GoVERNmENr 2 (1964);
Compare also the Appendicies with Foley's article at p. 30 listing (A) revenue bond
legislation, (B) authority legislation, and (C) cases construing revenue obligations.
132. Netherton, Area Development Authorities: A New Form of Govermnent by
Proclamation, 8 VAND. L. R~v. 683 (1955).
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lightenment, and the joint stock-company with its unequal controls
yielded under government pressure to the state-chartered corporation
and its concepts of one share, one vote, to which was eventually added
the principle of limited liability.
The industrial revolution received this heritage and developed it in
numerous ways. It worked out new relationships between government
and business and news ways to finance both. It demonstrated the utility
of the corporate device for private profit and for public regulation for
works of charity and institutions of religion. Before the nineteenth
century ended, the era of the corporate revolution was in full swing,
and the "big government" of World War I and the New Deal used
the experience of "big business" to fashion its own particular corporate
instrument.
Drawing upon the rich examples of the past, society of today has
created its own corporate form peculiarly suited to present needs and
has called it a "public authority." Seen in the context of its many
forerunners, little about it is new, except the recent recognition of the
wide variety of uses to which it may contribute. Even its name is old,
being new only in the special sense which it now symbolizes. As Fustel
de Coulanges wrote a century ago:
The past never completely dies for man. Man may forget it, but
he always preserves it within him. For, take him at any epoch, and he
is the product, the epitome, of all the earlier epochs. Let him look at
his own soul, and he can find and distinguish these different epochs by
what each of them has left within him. 33
What is true of man is equally true of man's institutions. Of the bet-
ter known social institutions, none has a longer history or greater vital-
ity than the corporation, whether self-initiated or state chartered. And,
in the family of corporations, none is more demanding of wider atten-
tion than the rambunctious adolescent, the "new" public authority.
133. FUSMi. DE COULANGrs, ThE ANcijwr Crry 14 (Small transL 1873).
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